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Whether a developing country finances training through payroll
taxes may depend on the country's stage of development.
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In most developing countries, the major pro-  added taxes and teml to rely instead on trade
grams of vocational training and skill develop-  taxes and specific excises (say, on drink, to-
ment are financed from general govemment  bacco, and gasoline). In countries where the
revenues.  Increasingly, however, earmarked  govenmment's  financing options are limited, pay-
payroll taxes have been introduced to finance  roll taxes may be attractive but administratively
training.  infeasible.
The authors summarize intemational experi-  Most countries using the payroll tax ap-
ence with payroll taxes, the two major types of  proach are situated in the lower-middle income
which reflect different objectives. Under the  range.  In this range, value-added taxes may be
traditional, so-called Latin American model,  equally justifiable economically but two things
revenues are earmarked to finance training  make the payroll tax approach more attractive:
provided by the state or a national training  the ability to target payroll taxes using differen-
authority. Under the levy-grant (or rebate)  tial tax rates by sector, and the rationale of the
scheme, payroll tax rebates are offered to  reverse social security scheme (that is, with
enterprises to set up or broaden in-service  workers receiving benefits when they are young
training programs  and essentially paying taxes later to cover the
training costs of workers who follow them.)
Whether payroll taxes are a more desirable
source of financing Lhtan  other altematives  As a country develops, other financing
probably depends upon the stage of a country's  altematives should become realistic - for
development.  instance, government guarantees for worker
loans, or tuition-paid programs (with partial
Few lower-income countries finance training  recovery of costs through user fee's  and a student
through payroll levies.  They may have only lim-  loan program).
ited access to such broadly-based taxes as value-
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In  most  developing  countries,  the  major  programs  of  vocational
training  and  manpower-skill  development  are  financed  from  general  revenues.
Increasingly,  however,  earmarked  payroll  taxes  are  employed  to finance
training. This  paper  summarizes  international  experience  with  these  payroll
taxes,  drawing  the  distinction  between  the  more  traditional  revenue  raising
schemes  on the  lines  of the  Latin  American  model  and the  newer  levy-grant
schemes.
Drawing  upon  experience  of  payroll  taxes  in  advanced  economies  it
discusses  the  incidence  of these  taxes  in  developing  countries  and  presents  an
economic  rationale  for  their  growing  use,  as  part of  a reverse  social  security
schemes. It  concludes  that  the  desirability  of  using  payroll  taxes  to  finance
training,  compared  to other  alternatives  available  to  developing  country
governments,  is likely  to  be contingent  upon  the  stage  of a country's
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In  most developing  countries,  the  major  programs  of  vocational
training  and  manpower-skill  development  are  financed  from  general  revenues,
although  increasingly  earmarked  payroll  taxes  are  being  used.  In this  paper
we both summarize  experience  with these  payroll  taxes,  and  evaluate  the
economic  rationale  for  their  growing  use.
While  their  use  would  seem  to  run  counter  to  the  presumption  that  on
efficiency  grounds  the  financing  of training  should  be by user  fees,  there  are
many reasons  why  governments  are  reluctant  to employ  user  fees  in this
context,  including  such  issues  as the  externality  effects  of training  and
arguments  for  parity  with the  trainees'  counterparts  in the  highly-subsidized
formal  schooling  system. Putting  these  aside,  user  fees  are  frequently
regarded  as impractical  because  participants  in  training  programs  are  severely
liquidity-constrained  as far  as their  ability  to raise  funds  through  borrowing
to  pay fees  and  other  program  costs  is  concerned. In such  circumstances,
heavy  reliance  on  user fees  to finance  these  programs  may  have  the  effect  of
discouraging  the  very  people  towards  whom the  training  programs  are  targeted.
Post-course  equity  participation  under  which  participants  in
programs  would  surrender  a share  of their  increased  wages  as whole  or part
payment  for  their  participation  in training  programs  might  seem  another
option. There  are,  however,  great  difficulties  in  keeping  track  of changes  in
wanes  attributable  to  such  programs. The  administration  oi such  equity-type
arrangements  is further  complicated  by the  need to  follow  program  participants
through  their  future  careers. Where  there  are  well  functioning  nationally
comprehensive  income  tax  systems,  this  may  be possible;  but for  the  vast
majority  of  developing  countries  such  arrangements  again  seem  infeasible.2
A further  option  may  be to attempt  to deal  directly  with the
liquidity  constraints  preventing  user  fee  financing.  This  might  be through
government  guarantees  for  loans  made  by private  sector  financial  institutions
to  program  participants,  or through  a separate  government  bank  empowered  to
make  such  loans. This  type  of  option  does  not,  thus  far,  seem to  have  been
used in  any  developing  country.
Finally,  come  the  options  of tax  finance,  which  in turn  raise
questions  of the  choice  of tax. Most  developing  (and  many  developed)
countries  use revenues  from  general  taxation  to subsidize  programs  of training
both in  formal  training  institutions  or in-service.  A growing  number  of
countries,  in addition  or as an  alternative,  use  various  forms  of earmarked
taxes  to  finance  vocational  training  and  skill  development,  the  most  commonly
used  such  tax  being  a percentage  of the  payrolls  of  companies.
While  the  popular  view (see  Dougherty  and  Tan, 1988)  seems  to  be
that  the  link  between  payroll  taxes  and  benefit-related  financing  of training
is  at best  tenuous,  we present  a rationale  for  earmarked  payroll  taxes  in
terms  of a reverse  social  security  scheme. Indeed,  it  can  be argued  that,
potentially,  earmarked  payroll  taxes  approximate  benefit-related  taxation  more
closely  than  any  other  tax  scheme,  such  as  sales  or income  taxes.
In the  next  section,  we summarize  the  extent  and  use  of earmarked
payroll  levies  in  developing  countries  around  the  world. This is  followed,  in
Section  3,  by a discussion  of the  incidence  of these  taxes  and  their  rationale
as part  of reverse  social  security  scheme. Implications  for  policy  are
presented  in the  concluding  section.3
2  Schemes  for  the  Financ_ng  of  Training  in  Use  in  Developing  Countri.'ts
In this  paper,  we use the  term  training  to refer  to  programs  of
skill  development  and  vocational  preparation  that  operate  outside  of the
formal  educational  system. These  comprise  a  wide range  of institutions,
including  training  centers  run  by th'  state  and  national  training  authorities,
group  training  schemes  run  by compan:.es  in  concert,  or  company  training
schemes,  on  and  off  the  job.  Their  basic  aim  is to  meet  perceived  skilled
manpower  needs,  both  in the  economy  generally  and  within  firms. Their  growth
in  developing  countries  in recent  years  seems  to reflect  concerns  over  the
labor  market  relevance  and  usefulness  of vocational  education  programs  offered
by  the  traditional  schooling  system.
Governments  can  use  taxes  and  incentives  in  a number  of  ways to
influence  the  level  of such  training  provision. General  revenues  may  be used
to  provide  training  in state-run  training  centers. Within  companies  training
can  be stimulated,  both  directly  by cash  subsidies  from  general  tax  revenues,
and  indirectly  by treating  training  expenditures  as deductible  costs  for
corporate  tax  purposes.l/  Alternatively,  or in  addition,  earmarked  taxes  for
the  finance  of manpower  training  may  be used.
Although  there  exist  a  wide  variety  of types  of special  taxes  for
the  finance  of training  (such  as the  0.2  percentage  tax  on imported  equipment
in Ecuador  or the  levy  of 0.25  percent  of the  value  of large  construction
projects  in  Hong  Kong),  the  predominant  form  is  a percentage  tax  levied  on the
1  The  following  are  amongst  those  countries  allowing  employers  to deduct
training  costs  from  taxable  profits  (usually  up to  a specified  percentage  of
such  profits):  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Fiji,  Korea,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  the
Philippines.4
wage  and  salary  bill  of firms. Our  discussion  is confined  to these  payroll
taxes.
lynes  of  payroll  taxes:
With  some  variation,  there  are  basically  two  major  types  of  payroll
taxes  in  developing  countries,  reflecting  rather  different  objectives  (and,  in
practice,  there  are  mixed  models). The  traditional  scheme  - the  so-called
Latin  American  model  - is  essentially  concerned  with generating  revenues  to
finance  training  provided  by the  public  sector  (for  a good  discussion  of the
Latin  American  experience,  see  Kugler  and  Reyes,  1978). The  alternative  levy-
grant,  or rebate,  scheme  aims  to  encourage  in-plant  provision  of training  by
firms  themselves  through  tax  incentives.  Thus,  payroll  tax  rebates  are
offered  to  enterprises  to set  up,  or  broaden,  established  programs  of in-
service  training.
Both  of these  types  of scheme  are  discussed  below. It should  be
noted,  however,  that  any  particular  scheme  may  entail  additional,
complementary,  objectives. For  example,  the  payroll  tax-training  scheme  in
Singapore  was,  at the  outset,  part  of  a broad  based  economic  restructuring
program,  aimed  at skill  upgrading  for  the  whole  labor  force,  and  ultimately  a
more  capital  intensive,  mechanized  economy. Unlike  the  case  of the  faulted
and  now  largely  defunct  British  levy-grant  scheme 2/ (by  far,  the  most
elaborate  and  best  documented),  which  attempted  to  counter  inter-firm  poaching
of trained  workers,  such  broader  considerations  have  been largely  absent  in
motivating  the  establishment  or design  of payroll  levy  schemes  in  developing
countries. The,  now  discredited,  poaching  rationale  for  government
2  For  critical  accounts  of the  British  scheme,  see  Ziderman  (1978),  and
Lees  and  Chiplin  (1970).5
intervention  in  the  training  sector,  however,  does  reappear  on occasion:
Mauritius  constitutes  a recent  case  in  point. 3/
Revenue-raising  schemes: Under  this  group  of tax  financed  training  schemes,
revenues  are  earmarked  to finance  training  provided  by the  state  or a national
training  authority. Schemes  of this  type  are  typically  found  in  Latin
American  and  Caribbean  countries.
First  introduced  in  Brazil  in  the  early  1940s,  payroll  levies  of
this  type  are  in  place  in ten  countries  in the  region. Revenues  from  these
levies  have  been  employed  to  build  up national  training  systems,  usually  run
by a quasi-autonomous  national  training  authority,  which,  at its  own  training
centers,  provides  a  wide range  of pre-employment  entry  and in-service  training
courses  for  manual  workers,  office  workers  and  managers. 4/  The  emphasis  is  on
public  sector  training  provision,  rather  than  on the  encouragement  of firms  to
undertake  training  themselves.
A variant  of the  scheme  (operating  in  Brazil,  Venezuela  and  more
recently  in  Honduras),  allows  for  at least  partial  exemption  from  the  levy
3  See  Mauritius  Employers  Association  (  1987). The illusion  stems  from
the  widely  held  view that  firms  are  discouraged  from  financing  training
because  of a fear  that  their  trained  workers  will  be "poached"  (recruited)  by
competitors,  thus  resulting  in  an overall  undersupply  of skilled  workers.
However,  as argued  by Becker  (1964)  training  in  general  skills  (usable  in  more
than  one  firm)  are  paid for  by the  workers  themselves,  not the  firm;  firm-
financed  training  in skills  specific  to the  training  firm  are,  by definition,
of no value  to  other  firms. Thus,  on theoretical  grounds,  poaching  will  not
result  in  market  failure  of this  type. Lees  and  Chiplin  (1970)  offer  a  good
account  of the  "poaching  illusion".
4  In  revenue  raising  schemes,  payroll  levies  may  not  be the  sole  source
of finance  of the  national  training  authority.  They  are  for  SENAI  and  SENAC
in Brazil,  for  SNPP  in Paraguay  and  SENATTI  in  Peru.  They  constitute  the
dominant  source  for  SENA  in  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  and  Venezuela,  and
considerably  less  in  wcuador  (SECAP)  and  Guatemala  (INTECAP). In  Argentina,
the  levy  is  only  a small  percentage  of the  financial  sources  of COMET.  (See
Kugler  and  Reyes  1978  for  additional  details).6
payment  for  those  firms  that  provide  an acceptable  in-company  training
program. As well as raising  revenue  for  public  sector  provision  of training,
this  option  also  offers  financial  incentives  to  employers  to set  up their  own
in-plant  training  programs.
Rebate  schemes: Under  this  group  of tax  assisted  programs,  the  payroll  levy
is  linked  to  a disbursement  scheme,  in  which  firms  receive  grants  related  to
their  level  of provision  of training. Rather  than  use  the  payroll  tax
proceeds  to  establish  public  sector  industrial  training  centers,  the
disbursement  scheme  creates  incentives  for  firms  to  set  up,  or  broaden,
established  programs  of in-service  training,  thus  qualifying  for  a rebate  up
to a specified  percentage  of the  tax  paid.
Grant  schemes  operate  in two  different  ways (see  Greig,  1976).
First,  under  the  cost  reimbursement  method  of grant  payment  (as  in  Singapore
or  Tunisia),  the  training  authority  pays  grants  to  firms  on a cost  incurred
basis,  for  certain  designated  types  of training  (on  or off  the  job).  Cost
reimbursement  schemes,  however,  may  be  wasteful  since,  in  order  to  receive  a
rebate  on the  payroll  tax,  firms  have  an incentive  to undertake  various
eligible  forms  of training  that  may  not  be germane  to  their  activities.  More
important,  cost  reimbursement  encourages  an ad  hoc,  piecemeal  approach  to
training  provision,  rather  than  pressing  the  firm  to  plan  its  training  program
in  a systematic,  comprehensive  way. 5/
5  The  Korean  scheme  is  not  strictly  a  payroll  tax  system. Large  firms
are  required  by law  to  provide  training  coe'ses  (of  at least  6  months
duration)  for  a certain  proportion  of the  workers  annually  (now  standing  at
somewhat  under  2  percent). Firms  that  do not  meet their  training  obligations
pay  a  p  capita  training  levy  (in  reality,  a fine  from  which  training  firms
are  exempt),  which  is  kept  significantly  below  average  training  costs  - a
factor  encouraging  firms  to  pay  the  levy,  rather  than  train,  for  some  30
percent  of  workers  legally  required  to  receive  training.7
Under  the  alternative  approval  approach  a grant  is  paid  to the  firm
conditional  on criteria  expected  to  be met  once  a systematic  training  approach
has  been  adopted. The  grant  is  usually  paid  according  to  a system  of  points
earned,  which  in turn  are  based  on the  criteria  describing  systematic
training. Thus,  in  thinking  about  its  eligibility  to qualify  for  a rebate  of
the  levy,  the  firm  is encouraged  to  act  systematically  in relation  to its
training  program. The systems  approval  approach  appears  in the  schemes  found
in  Nigeria  and  Zimbabwe.
Geographical  distribution:
Table  1  shows  the  geographical  distribution  of such  payroll  tax
schemes  across  developing  countries  by  broad  region  and  by type  of scheme. It
is clear  that  revenue  raising  schemes  have  not spread  widely  in the  developing
world  beyond  Latin  America;  the  only  other  examples  of pure  revenue-raising
payroll  taxes  seem  to  be those  in Zaire  and  Moroc'o,  where  a similar  payroll
tax  system  is in force,  and  Turkey  where  one  is  planned. On the  other  hand,
while  rebate  schemes  are  ab3ent  in the  Latin  American  countries,  this  seems  to
be the  preferred  form  of  payroll  levy  scheme  in  other  continents.
The  distribution  by income  level  of  payroll  tax  schemes  for  the
finance  of training  in developing  countries  is shown  in  Table  2  along  with
information  on the  tax  rates  used. This  table  shows  that  such  schemes  are
typically  found  in  lower  to  middle  level  income  countries,  i.e.  those
countries  with  GNP  per  capita  in the  range  $401  to  $1,635,  as defined  in the
World  Development  Report  (World  Bank,  1987). Nearly  half of  all  such
countries  have introduced  payroll  taxes  of this  type.8
Table  I
Banmarked Payroll  Taxes  Used  to  Finance  TraininF
in  Developing  Countries,  by Region  +
Revenue  Raising  Scheme  Rebate  Scheme
Region  Cost  Systems
Reimbursement  Approval
Afric  Mauritania*  Benin*  Nigeria







Latin  America  Argentina













North  Africa  Morocco  Jordan**
and tbhe  Turkey**  Tunisia
Middle  East
*  Revenues  in  practice  not  earmarked  for  training.
**  Planned,  not  yet implemented.
***  Not,  strictly  speaking,  a payroll  tax  scheme  (see  text).
+  El Salvador,  Malaysia,  Pakistan,  and  Senegal  have  all,  in recent  years,
considered  and  rejected  proposals  for  a payroll  tax.9
Although  the  division  between  countries  with revenue  raising  schemes
and those  operating  rebate  schemes  is  analytically  useful,  as with  all
institutional  generalizations,  the  distinction  should  not  be pressed  too  far.
Countries  may seek  dual  objectives  from  payroll  levy  schemes  which,  in
practice  may, incorporate  elements  of  both  approaches.
Thus  in 1979,  the  Industrial  Training  Fund  in  Nigeria  (the  national
training  authority  financed  by the  training  tax),  opened  its  first  vocational
training  center  (with  direct,  state  provided  training);  this  supplemented  its
major  activity  of  encouraging  enterprises  to  train  through  the  offer  of
financial  incentives.  Similarly,  in a  number  of  Latin  American  countries,
national  training  authorities  (which  are  financed  by payroll  levies),  have
broadened  their  traditional  role  as a leading  training  institution,  to  become
outward-oriented,  encompassing  promoting  and  guiding  training  activities  in
outside  enterprises  (Ducci,  1983). Colombia,  Peru  and  Paraguay  provide
examples  of this  dual,  complementary  approach.
Coverage  of schemes:
These  earmarked  payroll  levy  schemes  all  differ  among  the  countries
that  use  them. Variations  exist  in the  tax  rate  and  coverage  (both  in terms
of economic  sectors  and  size  of firms  included  in  the  scheme).
Table  2  shows  rates  of tax,  most  varying  from  0.5  percent  to 2.0
percent,  (in  the  case  of  Venezuela,  there  is an  additional  0.5  percent  levied
on the  wages  of trainee  workers). The tax  rates  have tended  to  be stable  over
time,  although  there  are  some  exceptions. In  Singapore,  rates  were set
initially  at 2  percent  and  raised  some  months  later  to  4 percert  of the
payroll  of low-paid  workers  only; the  rate  subsequently  fell  and  is  now  1
percent. In  Nigeria  the  rate,  which  stood  at 3  percent  at the  outset,  fell10
quickly  to the  current  level  of 1  percent,  while  in  Morocco  the  rate  was
recently  raised  ftom  1 to  1.6  percent.
Table.2
Financing  Training! Payroll  Tax  Rates
in  DeveloRing  Cou 1tries.  by Income  Level
Income  Level  Revenue  Raising  Scheme  Rebate  Scheme
(GNP  per  Country  Tax  Rate (%)  Country  Tax  Rate (%)
capita,  1985)
iLo  Haiti*  1.0  Benin*  2.0
($  400  and  less)  Zaire  1.0  Kenya  1.0
Lower-Middle  Columbia  2.0  Ivory  Coast  1.5
($401-$1635)  Costa  Rica  1.0  Jordan**  1.0
Dominican  1.0  Mauritius**  1.0
Republic
Ecuador  0.05  Nigeria  1.0
Guatemala  0.5-1.0  Tunisia  2.0







U22er-Middle  Argentina  1.0  Fiji  1.0
($1636-$4300)  Barbados  0.5  Singapore  1.0
Brazil  1.0-1.2  Taiwan  1.5
Venezuela  2.0  Korea***
*  revenues  in  practice  not  earmarked  for  training.
**  planned,  not  yet  implemented.
***  Not,  strictly  speaking,  a payroll  tax  scheme  (see  text).
n.a.  - not  available.11
Countries  also  differ  in  the  sectors  covered  by  the  tax. In  some
cases  agriculture  and,  more  frequently,  the  public  sector,  is  excluded.
Generally,  there  are  uniform  tax  rates  across  sectors,  but  in  some  countries
(such  as  Colombia  and  Honduras)  the  government  sector  is  taxed  at  a  lower
rate. In  some  countries,  larger  firms  pay  a  higher  tax  (in  both  Colombia  and
Brazil,  there  is  a  surtax  of  0.2  percont  on  firms  with  more  than  500
employees),  while  in  others  small  firms  are  exempt.  Such  exemptions  are
usually  based  on  the  number  of  employees  (loe than  5  workers  in  Honduras,
Peru  and  Venezuela,  less  than  10  in  Colombia,  les than  25  in  Nigeria),  while
in  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras  exemption  may  be  claimed  alternatively,  on  th,e
basis  of  size  of  capital  assets.12
3  The Incidence  of Payroll  Taxes.  and  the  Reverse  Social  Security  Rationale
for  Their  Use
Incidence:
If earmarked  payroll  taxes  are  so  widely  used in  the  developing
world,  the  question  this  begs is,  why?  Payroll  taxes  for  financing  training
are formally  levied  on enterprises  and  are  widely  believed  to  be borne  by
these  same  enterprises,  making  these  taxes  (in  conventional  thinking  in  these
countries  at least)  fair. But  on  whom  does  the  ultimate  burden  of these
levies  fall?  Do firms  themselves  indeed  bear  these  taxes  or are  they  passed
on to either  the  consumer  in the  form  of  higher  prices  (and  thus  indirectly  on
labor)  or directly  on labor  in terms  of lower  net-of-tax  wages?
While  these  issues  have  not  been  examined  empirically  for  developing
countries,  there  is  a sizeable  literature  relating  to the  economic  effects  of
payroll  taxes  in industrialized  countries.  The  most  prevalent  t  e  of payroll
taxes  in these  countries  are  combined  employer  and  employee  contributions  to
various  social  insurance  funds,  which  in  turn  provide  such  benefits  as old  age
security,  health  care,  unemployment  insurance  and  the  like.
It is  widely  believed  among  economists,  based  on  empirical  studies
for  economically  developed  countries,  that  the  burden  of social  security  taxes
falls  largely  on labor  (see  Levin,  1983  for  a recent  reiteration  of this
view). The  incidence  of employer,  as  well  as employee,  contributions  to
social  insurance  programs  are  thought  to  be  borne  by labor  in the  form  of
lower  real  wages;  the  authoritative  source  of this  empirical  result  is the13
study  by Brittan  (1972)  of the  payroll  tax  as a financing  vehicle  for  the
wider  social  security  system  in  the  United  States. 6/
What  underlies  this  argument  is the  following. The  tax  on the
payroll  of the  firm  is  treated  as a total  tax  which  is  paid  by labor
independently  of whether  or  not taxes  are  paid  by employers  or employees.
With  low  labor  supply  elasticities,  labor,  being  the  fixed  factor,  will  bear
the  burden  of the  tax. Figure  1 illustrates  this  outcome. If  the  supply  of
labor  is  perfectly  inelastic  the  only  effect  of a payroll  tax  is  to reduce  the
wage  received  by labor  from  the  gross-of-tax  wage (wg)  to the  net-of-tax  wage
(wn)  with the  difference  between  the  two  being  given  by the  tax. There  is  no
impact  of the  tax  on labor  supplied,  nor is there  any  impact  on the  costs  of
firms. In this  case,  the  payroll  tax  is  borne  exclusively  by labor.
This  simple  result,  (which  we shall  argue  is relevant  to developing
countries)  is,  however,  almost  certainly  not  applicable  to  developing
countries  in quite  the  same  way.  This  is for  a number  of reasons. Firstly,
the  labor  market  in  developing  countries  is  not  of the  same  form  as operates
in industrialized  countries. Secondly,  the  payroll  tax  in  developing
countries  is  effectively  restricted  to  urban  employment  since  agriculture  is
excluded.
6  Brittain  result  that  firms  do  not  bear the  burden  of a  payroll  tax  but
shift  it  entirely  onto  labor,  has  been repeated  in further  research  (e.g.
Vroman  1974). Other  studies,  however,  show  a less  than  full  shifting  onto
labor  in the  short  run,  e.g.,  75  percent  for  the  U.K. (Parkin,  Sumner  and
Ware,  1976),  50  percent  for  Ireland  (Hughes  1985)  and for  Sweden  (Holmlund
1983). One  limitation  of the  Brittain  result,  in the  present  context,  is that
it  was unable,  statistically,  to  distinguish  between  backward  and  forward
shifting.14
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The  differences  these  factors  make  as regards  the  outcome  of tax
incidence  experiments  can  be clearly  seen  if  a Harris-Todaro  (1970)  structure
is  assumed  as representative  of the  labor  market  in  developing  countries. In
the  Harris-Todaro  model  of developing  country  rural-to-urban  migration,  there
is  a downward  rigid  real  wage in the  urban  sector  reflecting  extensive
government  involvement  in  the  modern  urbanized  sector  through  wage fixing
powers  of government-owned  enterprises.
In response  to the  fixed  urban  wage,  labor  leaves  the  rural  sector
but  does  not  do so in  a  way  which  equates  wages  across  the  two  sectors,  since
some  of the  labor  which  migrates  to  the  urban  sector  remains  unemployed.  This
is  often  rationalized  on the  basis  of the  so-called  "one-way  ticket"
assumption,  i.e.  that  due  to liquidity  constraints  laborers  are  only  able  to
obtain  the  funds  to  pay  for  a one-way  ticket  to  the  city. Once in  the  city,
labor  is  unable  to return. Unemployment  is  alternatively  sometimes
rationalized  in  Harris-Todaro  models  by the  presence  of repeated  re-selection
for  hiring  and,  hence,  unemployment  is  always  probalistic.
Under  either  of these  rationalizations  for  unemployment,  the  labor
market  equilibrium  condition  in  a Harris-Todaro  model  is  given  by
(1)  WR _ p.wu
where  wu  represents  the  fixed  urban  wage,  p is the  probability  of  being
employed  in the  urban  sector  conditional  upon  location  in  the  urban  sector,
and  wR represents  the  free  market  wage in  the  rural  sector. In the  risk
neutral  case,  urban-rural  migration  will  proceed  up to  the  point  where  the
expected  wage is  equalized  across  the  two  sectors.16
If a  payroll  tax  at rate  t is  now introduced  in the  urban  sector
only,  as is common  in  developing  countries,  this  reduces  the  fixed  wage
received  by employees  in  the  urban  sector  to  wU(l-t). As a result,  the  tax
will  cause  some  of the  labor  which  was  previously  unemployed  in the  urban
sector  to return  to the  rural  sector,  which  in  turn  depresses  the  wage rate  in
the  rural  sector. Both  wR and  p  change  in  response  to the  tax,  and  the
effect  on the  total  return  to labor  is  ambiguous.
As Imam  and  Whalley  (1985)  have  shown  in an  analysis  of the
incidence  effects  of a sector-specific  minimum  wage,  unlike  in  a traditional
tax  model  there  are  additional  incidence  effects  in  a Harris-Todaro  model  due
to  changes  in induced  unemployment.  In that  paper,  numerical  simulations  for
a  model  of  Mexico  are  reported. In several  of the  analyses,  capital  is found
to  bear the  burden  of a  government  sector-specific  minimum  wage in the  urban
sector.
Since  a payroll  tax  in  the  Harris-Todaro  model  is  equivalent  to  a
reduction  in  a sector-specific  minimum  wage,  Imam  and  Whalley's  analysis
suggests  that  labor  would  bear  the  burden  of such  a tax,  as in a traditional
developed  country  analysis. Their  numerical  simulations,  however,  depend  on
several  key  parameters,  including  factor  substitution  elasticities.
Payroll  taxes  Vs reverse  social  security:
If it is  indeed  plausible  to  argue  that  workers  do,  in fact,  bear
the  burden  of payroll  taxes  in the  form  of lower  wages,  the  use  of payroll
taxes  in  developing  countries  to finance  vocational  training  involves  taxing
employees  rather  firms. In  terms  of  benefit-related  taxation,  to  developing-
country  ways  of thinking,  the  payroll  tax  may seem  to involve  poor targeting.17
Alternatively,  however,  a finding  that  the  workers  bear  the  burden
of  payroll  taxes  in  developing  countries  may  provide  a rationale  for  the  use
of the  payroll  taxes  to finance  training  programs,  in terms  of a reverse
social  security  scheme. Under  such  a scheme,  workers  receive  the  benefits  of
training  while  they  are  young,  and  then  pay  the  taxes  through  the  rest  of
their  working  lifo  to cover  the  training  costs  of  workers  who  follow  them. In
this  way, transfers  take  place  to  younger  workers  from  older  ones  through  the
tax  financing  training,  but  over  the  life-cycle  of workers  individual  benefits
approximate  taxes  paid.
As  with all  social  security  schemes,  there  are  difficulties  with  the
start-up  of such  operations.  When a scheme  is first  introduced,  there  will  be
older  workers  who are  taxed,  but  who  are  unlikely  to  receive  training  benefits
financed  by the  scheme. They  are  the  losers. Should  such  a scheme  be
terminated,  there  will  be workers  who  have  benefitted  from  training  but  will
not  be required  to  pay taxes  to the  full.
However,  while  it  is true  that  workers  are  likely  to receive  the
bulk  of their  training  when  they  are  young  at the  outset  of their  careers  as
initial  or  job-entry  level  training,  continuous  skill  development  and in-
service  training,  spread  over  the  life-cycle,  is  both significant  and
widespread  (see  Ben-Porath,  1967,  and  Mincer,  1974,  for  life-cycle  models  of
human  capital  accumulation).  Continuous  training  serves  such  varied  purposes
as performance  upgrading,  skill  renewal,  career  development  and  promotion
within  the  firm,  as well  as retraining  to facilitate  occupational  mobility  in
response  to structural  and  technological  change.
Thus,  it  would  be mistaken  to  view  the  reverse  social  security
scheme,  at any  given  time  point,  as a simple  transfer  from  older  and18
experienced  workers  to  younger  ones. As with  social  security  schemes,  where
health  and  unemployment  benefits  may  be available  over the  life-cycle,  in
addition  to old  age  security  benefits,  so in  the  case  of the  reverse  social
security  scheme  to finance  training,  the  worker  may  benefit  from  training
(financed  by payroll  tax  revenues)  at  various  points  in  his  working  life,
though  more  usually  at the  outset.
The  efficacy  of any  given  scheme  will depend  on how  closely
individual  tax  payments  match  the  training  benefits  received. The  nature  of
training  programs  is such  that  costs  will  differ  markedly  by sector;  workers
in the  financial  sector,  for instance,  clearly  need to  undergo  very different
training  programs  than  workers  in  heavy  manufacturing:  these  differing
training  programs  are  likely  to involve  substantially  different  training
expenditures.  While  most  countries  have  uniform  payroll  levies  by sector,  in
some instances  there  are  different  rates  by  broad  sector  group. Benefit-
related  taxation would  suggest  the  introduction  of appropriate
differentiation  in  tax  rates  across  sectors,  to reflect  these  differences  in
training  costs. Within  sectors,  the  larger  absolute  tax  payments  made  by
higher  earning  workers  (given  that  payroll  taxes  are  proportional,  with  no
ceilings  in operation),  is  consistent  with  the  positive  relationship  between
the  level  of a  worker's  formal  education  (and  therefore  earnings)  and  the
amount  of training  received  on-the-job  (Mincer,  1974).
The  central  question,  however,  in examining  how  far  earmarked
payroll  tax-training  provision  schemes  approximate  reverse  social  security,  is
how  equitably  training  opportunities  are  spread  amongst  workers. This,  in
turn,  may  be very  much influenced  by the  main  purpose  that  the  payroll  tax
serves  (whether  to raise  revenues  for  public  sector  training  provision  or to19
encourage  on-the-job  training  by firms),  as  well  as  by the  particular  set  of
training  programs  that  are  financed  by the  tax.  For  payroll  tax  schemes
without  rebates,  that  finance  public  sector  training  centers,  the  question  at
issue  is:  are training  opportunities  well  spread  across  the  various  sections
of the  labor  force,  by age (thus  offsetting  the  start  up problem),  by skill
and  occupational  category,  and  by education  level?  Presumably,  workers  from
levy-exempt  firms  are  entitled  to  attend  public  sector  training  courses
financed  by the  payroll  tax,  thereby  reaping  the  benefits  of the  scheme
without  contributing  to its  costs:  how far  this  constitutes  a serious  problem
will  depend  on the  number  of firms,  and  workers,  involved.
Of the  two  main  types  of rebate  scheme,  cost  reimbursement  is likely
to  be less  acceptable  in terms  of reverse  social  security  considerations,  than
systems-based  schemes. The  former,  in  encouraging  training  along  limited,
specified  directions,  is  unlikely  to  provide  the  broad  range  of training
opportunities  that  are  associated  with the  latter  type  of scheme.
An interesting  exercise  in  fine  tuning  is  provided  by financing
arrangements  for  training  in  Malawi. The Industrial  Training  Fund (ITF),
established in 1973,  meets  the  bulk of the  costs  of  running  the  national
apprenticeship  scheme  (both  the  reimbursement  of apprentice  wages  and  the
grants-in-aid  to technical  colleges  providing  formal  training).  The ITF
assesses  both government  and  private  sector  employers  on the  basis  of the
number  of  workers  employed  in  particular  skilled  occupations,  leading  to  a tax
per  skilled  worker,  levied  on  all  enterprises  with  a skilled  labor  force. The
head tax  for  each  skill  occupation  is  set  sufficiently  high to  raise  the
required  revenues  to  meet  training  outlays. The  tax  thus  varies  by skilled
occupational  category  and  cost  of training. Assuming  that  this  tax  is  passed20
on to the  skilled  worker,  the  scheme,  although  not  strictly  a payroll  tax
scheme,  does  represent  a focussed  form  of reverse  social  security,  with
skilled  workers  financing  the  training  of  apprentices.
Finally,  the  reverse  social  security  argument  requires  that  the
funds  raised  by payroll  taxation  be indeed  earmarked  for  training:
unfortunately  this  is  not  always  the  case. For  example,  in  both  Brazil  and
Singapore,  revenues  have  been subject  to  diversion  to other  uses,  and  there  is
also the  risk  that  the  funds  will  not  be spent  but amassed  as surpluses,  as
has  occurred  in some  Latin  American  countries,  Kenya,  Nigeria  and  Singapore.
Again,  the  training  levies  in  Benin,  Haiti  and  Mauritania,  for  differing
reasons,  have  not  been  earmarked  for  training  but  rather  enter  public
revenues.7/
Clearly,  no general  conclusions  can  be drawn;  the  question  of how
closely  the  benefits  of training  programs  financed  by payroll  taxes  are tied
to those  bearing  the  tax,  will  depend  on the  equity  of training  opportunities
associated  with the  program  as a  whole. This  is  a policy  issue  that  must  be
resolved  by individual  developing  countries:  in some  cases  efficiency
arguments  may indicate  less  equity  in the  spread  of training  opportunities
than  would  be required  of  payroll  tax  schemes  that  are  rationalized  in  terms
of reverse  social  security  arguments.
7  For  example  in  Haiti  payroll  taxes  are  not, in  practice,  earmarked  for
training  because  all  taxes  (and  other  revenues  including,  for  example,
university  student  fees)  have  been  agglomerated,  and  passed  to the  Treasury.21
4  Imulications  for  Policy:
The  payroll  tax  is  likely  to  be a relatively  efficient  revenue
raising  device  compared  to  other  tax  sources,  but  probably  no more so than
other  broadly  based  alternatives,  such  as a  value-added  tax.  If,  largely  for
administrative  reasons,  developing  countries  are  constrained  to tax  only  the
urban  sector,  this  might  weaken  the  efficiency  argument  favoring  payroll
taxes,  although  it  is often  the  case  in  such  countries  that  the  value-added
tax  is similarly  restricted  to  manufacturing.
It is important  to  caution  against  the  belief  that  the  form  of the
tax  is  of much  consequence  for  assessing  its  economic  effects. As we have
argued,  taxes  levied  formally  on employers,  which  may  seem  attractive  because
the  firm  rather  than  the  worker  is  being  taxed,  may  be deceptive. Most
developed  country  literature  treats  all,  or at least  a significant  part,  of
payroll  taxes,  whether  employer  or  employee  based,  as borne  by labor. The
situation  in  developing  countries  is  different  to the  extent  that  labor  market
imperfections  are  present  and  payroll  taxes  apply  only  to the  urban  sector.
Existing  literature,  limited  as it is,  suggests  that  similar  incidence
conclusions  will  nonetheless  apply,  i.e.  that  workers  ultimately  pay  the  cost
of payroll  taxes  in the  form  of lower  wages.
The  desirability  of  using  payroll  taxes  to  finance  training,
compared  to  the  other  alternatives  available  to  developing  country
governments,  is  likely  to  be contingent  upon the  stage  of a  country's
development.  Low  income  developing  countries  may  have  only  limited  access  to
such  broadly  based  taxes  as  value  added  taxes  and  tend  to rely  instead  on
trade  taxes  and  specific  excises  such  as on  drink,  tobacco  and  gasoline. It
seems  clear  that  where  the  financing  options  of governments  are  limited  as in22
lower  income  countries,  payroll  taxes  remain  attractive,  though  they  may  not
be administratively  feasible. We have  seen  that  very  few  lower  income
countries  resort  to  payroll  levies  to finance  training.
For  countries  in  the  lower  middle  income  range,  and  where  more
broadly  based  financing  alternatives  are  available,  genuine  issues  of choice
come  to the  fore. Yet the  formal  economic  equivalence  between  value  added
taxes  and  payroll  taxes  suggests  that  this  choice  can  be overblown  in
importance.  Nonetheless,  the  reverse  social  security  scheme  rationale  for  the
use of  payroll  taxes  to finance  training  programs,  and the  ability  to target
payroll  taxes  by using  differential  tax  rates  by sector,  all  suggest  that  the
payroll  tax  approach  may  be  more attractive.  In fact  we have  noted  that  most
of the  countries  utilizing  payroll  taxes  to  finance  training  are  situated  in
the  lower  middle  income  range.
With  the  process  of further  economic  and  institutional  development,
it should  become  realistic  to consider  other  alternatives  to tax  finance  of
training. For instance,  thinking  through  the  reasons  why  such  training  is
offered  by the  public  rather  than  the  private  sector  may  lead  to  conclusions
as to the  nature  of the  market  failure  involved. Attacking  any  such  failures
directly,  such  as by government  guarantees  for  worker  loans  if liquidity
constraints  are  the  problem,  rather  than  indirectly  by tax  financed  public
sector  programs,  may  be one  way  to  proceed. Tuition  paid  programs  could
perhaps  be more  fully  investigated,  with  a partial  recovery  of costs  through
user  fees  and  a student  loan  program. Earmarking  revenues  from  payroll  taxes
as financing  vehicles  for  vocational  training  no doubt  remains  an active
option  for  many  developing  countries,  but  both  the  tax  and  non-tax
alternatives,  as they  become  available,  should  be kept  under  scrutiny.23
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